会计名家姜付秀教授：中国的公司治理，也必定是世界的！

姜付秀会计学术联盟 2023-02-24

舞弊“29岁现象”，会计名家林斌教授团队最新发现！
四位中国会计学者五年磨一剑终被国际顶尖期刊接受！
贸大会计学者"审计师自恋”文章在国际顶尖期刊发表！
央财会计学者第五篇TopA被国际会计顶尖期刊接爱！
“青年长江学者”领衔的《公司治理》慕课推荐！
中国商业会计学会2021年学术年会征文
国家级会计类一流本科建设点首批高校名单
2020年国家会计类一流本科建设点名单公布

北京国家会计学院2021年会计专硕等接受调剂

500人微信群发布财会教师招聘信息，仅剩3席！

建议 星标 ☆ 联盟 平台

二0二一我们一起追逐梦想

出品@会计学术联盟(ID：KJXSLM) ,会计名家、学者观点专栏
来源:老姜聊治理公众号；萌小二编辑，原文标题是“中国的，也必定是世界的！”

姜付秀

中国人民大学教授、博导

每一年，Review of Finance 主编Alex Edmans教授都会从本年度发表在RF期刊上的论文中挑出一篇，在牛津大学出版社博客上做一介绍。牛津大学出版社的博客是世界上阅读量最大的学术博客。Alex Edmans教授选择的标准是：该文章不仅在学术上是一流的（academically first-rate），同时还需要是实务界高度关注的。从往年的经验看，被选中的文章都获得了本年度的RF的最佳论文。2020年，我们发表在该期刊的论文“Corporate governance in China: a survey”很荣幸被Alex选中。无疑，这说明我们的论文还不错，但更为重要的是，这表明中国公司治理问题是一个世界学术界和实务界关注的重要问题。恰如我们文章所揭示的那样，目前已经有很多关于中国公司治理问题的文章发表在国际top期刊，我们相信，未来会更多。不仅仅因为中国为检验那些在西方发达资本市场没法检验的理论假设提供了很好的场景，更因为中国既重要又特殊，丰富的公司治理实践为构建中国特色公司治理理论提供了很好的条件，这对于丰富和发展公司治理理论具有重要意义。
感谢诸多同行在中国公司治理这一学术领域所作出的卓越成就，他们的工作为我们的文章奠定了坚实的基础，提供了丰富的素材。我们期望我们的论文获得年度最佳论文的殊荣，期望该论文对丰富公司治理理论有所贡献，更期望对于中国以及与中国相似国家的公司治理实践有所启发。以下是我们在牛津大学出版社博客文章。同时，我们也将链接放在这里，便于那些对牛津大学出版社博客感兴趣的朋友去阅读其他作者的文章（https://blog.oup.com/2021/）。

The horizontal agency problem and how China deals with it

By Fuxiu Jiang and Kenneth A. Kim

On December 18, 2020, the United States passed the Holding Foreign Companies Accountable Act. The law stipulates that any US-listed foreign company will be removed from American stock exchanges if it does not comply with US auditing oversight rules within three years. It is well known that this law is specifically aimed at US-listed Chinese firms.

For investors, the issue of corporate transparency is paramount. When college students take their first finance course, they are taught that there are two major costs that can hinder the firm’s valuation. The first is information asymmetry. Outsiders, such as investors and lenders, do not know the firm as well as the firm’s insiders. Therefore, for example, the firm’s cost of capital might be higher than it should be. The second major cost is the agency problem. While shareholders own the firm and managers control the firm, managers may not act in the best interest of shareholders, and this problem can be greatly exacerbated when there is a high degree of information asymmetry. In the early 2000s, we witnessed how significant this agency problem can be. Because of the actions of self-serving executives at firms such as Enron and WorldCom, it contributed to an investor confidence crisis around the world, which eventually led to major corporate governance reforms world-wide.

Shareholders and managers are not the only stakeholders that benefit when stock markets function well. The country’s overall economy also benefits. Economies cannot grow unless they have well-functioning stock markets. Up until now, China was a striking exception to this rule. However, for China’s growth to continue, it recognizes that a well-functioning stock market must play a major role. Therefore, two important questions are the following. First, what is the nature of the agency problem in China? Second, what is the potential solution to this problem?

In China, the main agency problem is the conflict of interest between large shareholders and minority shareholders. Because this agency problem is among shareholders, we can call this a “horizontal” agency problem, which is unlike the “vertical” agency problem that can exist between shareholders and managers in Western countries and in other developed nations. The main reason why the agency problems are different between Western firms and Chinese firms is because unlike in the West, pretty much every Chinese listed-firm has a very large shareholder. On average a Chinese listed-firm’s largest shareholder owns at least 30% of the firm. In the West, ownership is largely diffuse, and so managers control the firms. However, in China, the large shareholders control their firms.

In China, the horizontal agency problem is quite significant. Throughout the 1990s and early part of the 2000s, controlling shareholders of listed-firms would simply take money from the firm. They claimed that these were “intercorporate loans,” but these loans were interest-free and almost never paid back. On the balance sheets, they were booked as “other receivables.” This outright theft from minority shareholders was not a trivial amount. On average, other receivables accounted for almost 10% of the firm’s total assets. Chinese securities regulators came down hard on this practice, and now it is essentially eradicated. However, as long as there are large shareholders, the horizontal agency problem will continue to exist. For example, controlling shareholders can engage in related party transactions with the firm on favorable terms. An example would be the firm buying an asset from the shareholder at a high price. Note that this form of expropriation from minority shareholders is almost impossible to detect. Therefore, this gives rise to the crucial question of how China is dealing with this agency problem.

In the West, there are many potential solutions to the vertical agency problem. For example, securities analysts, institutional investors, large lenders such as banks, independent auditors, and boards of directors, can serve as corporate monitors. However, in China, these potential monitors are limited in their ability to protect minority shareholders. For example, most board directors are not independent, and they are often appointed by large shareholders. In addition, given that large shareholders are more entrenched than firm managers, the horizontal agency may be harder to address than the vertical agency problem. Therefore, the main solution to the horizontal agency problem in China rests on having strong laws and regulations, and to enforce them.

There are many corporate and securities laws in China, including the 1985 Accounting Law, to ensure the quality of accounting information, the 1986 Enterprise Bankruptcy Law, to improve the quality of enterprises by eliminating inefficient ones, the 1993 Company Law and the 1998 Securities Law, to protect minority investors, and there is also the 1999 Contract Law and the 2007 Property Rights Law. These laws have been updated and improved upon several times. Are these laws and regulations, and the regulatory authorities, effective at mitigating the horizontal agency problem in China? According to anecdotal evidence and academic research, the answer seems to be mostly yes, and especially recently. For example, it is now difficult for controlling shareholders to engage in favorable related party transactions, and this is because of a regulation that allows minority shareholders to vote on these transactions. Throughout the 1990s and early part of the 2000s, it was common for scholars to criticize China’s laws and institutions. Today, it is more appropriate to say that China’s laws and institutions have dramatically improved.

In addition to recognizing the horizontal agency problem and identifying the potential solution, there is a third important question when it comes to Chinese firms and their stocks. What about state-owned enterprises (SOEs)? For many Chinese listed-firms, the largest shareholder is the government. SOEs make up the majority of the market capitalization of the Chinese stock markets. State ownership of enterprises is often criticized by Western scholars because of their underperformance and because the government might extract resources from the firm (that is, the government may be a “grabbing hand”). However, in China, while SOEs do underperform, they do not fail. For example, the government sometimes provides SOEs with favorable bank loans and other subsidies. Therefore, the government is more like a “helping hand.” In our view, the helping hand is justified because SOEs are tasked with the responsibility of maintaining national and social interests, such as making capital investments and maintaining industrial production, and also maintaining social stability, such as maintaining excess employment. Therefore, we feel that Western criticisms of state-owned firms, especially when it comes to China, may be misplaced.

Finally, Chinese companies not only have a responsibility to investors, they have a responsibility to all stakeholders, including society at large. Therefore, another important question is whether corporate social responsibility (CSR) matters in China. Chinese citizens and consumers care about social issues, but right now, they are relying on the government to carry out CSR initiatives and programs. The government seems to be somewhat effective in promoting CSR. However, while there is still a long way to go for Chinese firms to be truly interested in CSR, we think the future is bright.

In sum, Chinese firms are vulnerable to a significant agency problem, but China is well aware of it and is tackling the problem. This is important, not only for China, but also for the world, given that China will soon become the world’s largest economy.

全球“华人高端会计金融学者群”欢迎您加入！

想与发表在国内外顶级会计与金融期刊学者交流吗？如果您是在国外读博的，在国外任教的，或在SSCI发表文章至少一篇，国内知名期刊如管理世界、经济研究、南开管理评论、金融研究、CJAS，CJAR，中国会计评论，会计研究、中国工业经济、审计研究等有文章发表，欢迎有缘人联系盟小二(微信13717527221)，加好友请注明：姓名+学历+职称+单位，符合条件的，将被邀请进群，加群从速！如果暂达不到条件，财会领域博士(生)欢迎加全球华人会计金融博士群，待满足条件后升级加入高端学者群！

全球会计院长/系主任群、高校会计教师群，财务总监百人慧.能量场等现开放申请，咨询会员加入，可联系萌小二（微信:13717527221，加微信注明：姓名+单位+职称+学历或职务）

学习资源下载

1、关注会计学术联盟公众号

扫码关注奥

2、给会计学术联盟公众号发信息

陈汉文教授团队中国公司避税TAR文章下载

回复：避税

审计师自恋影响与客户的谈判吗？CAR文章下载

回复：审计师自恋

中国会计教授乡土研究三篇文章下载

回复：乡土

中国审计研究路在何方？文献下载